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Jews and Muslims in contemporary French newspaper discourse (2000–2017)

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Abstract

Jews and Muslims in France never formed singular communities and never solely or primarily interacted with each other as a function of ethnoreligious identity categories. Rather, their on-the-ground interactions often took place as a function of a variety of other identifications, solidarities, and experiences. Yet, media discourse commonly constructs Jews and Muslims as homogeneous, disparate, and separate communities and their relations as oppositional and troubled. This article examines how Jews and Muslims are relationally defined and constructed in media discourse, focusing on the national dailies *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. My analysis reveals the discursive patterns that emerge in articles on Jews and Muslims and how these representations implicitly construct 'Jews' and 'Muslims' and their 'relations'. In doing so, I make two main arguments about newspaper reporting on Jewish–Muslim relations in France: (1) With some exceptions, Jews and Muslims are constructed as two separate, homogeneous communities and their relations presented as tense and problematic; (2) Jews tend to be presented as fully integrated and their representation is in general positive, while Muslims are more often presented as not fully integrated – or even as at odds with French society and its values – and their representation is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, negative.

Keywords

discourse analysis, ethnoreligious identity, Jewish–Muslim relations, newspaper analysis, racialisation

Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, Jews and Muslims in France never formed singular communities and never solely or primarily interacted with each other as a function of fixed ethnoreligious identity categories. Rather, their on-the-ground interactions often

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took place as a function of a variety of other identifications, solidarities, and experiences (Katz, 2015; Mandel, 2014). The catch-all term 'Jewish–Muslim relations' risks obscuring the historical and present realities of on-the-ground interactions and, instead, suggests that Jews and Muslims in France form two disparate communities and that the complex and diverse interactions between them can be reduced to (troubled) binary relations. Contemporary French media discourse plays an important part in the construction and maintenance of these identity categories. Accordingly, this article examines how Jews and Muslims are relationally defined and constructed in media discourse, focusing on the national dailies *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* due to their considerable framing power in terms of 'agenda-setting' (Kuhn, 2011: 42).

My analysis reveals the discursive patterns that emerge in articles on Jews and Muslims and how these representations implicitly construct 'Jews' and 'Muslims' and their 'relations'. In doing so, I make two main arguments about newspaper reporting on Jews and Muslims in France: (1) With some exceptions, Jews and Muslims are constructed as two separate, homogeneous *communities* and their relations presented as tense and problematic; (2) Jews tend to be presented as fully integrated and their representation is in general positive, while Muslims are more often presented as not fully integrated – or even as at odds with French society and its values – and their representation is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, negative.

In order to determine how newspapers frame reporting on Jews and Muslims in France, I perform two levels of analysis. First, I isolate the salient frames[1] found in articles relating to Jews and Muslims in France from 2000 to 2017, obtained through consecutive sampling, from two major French daily newspapers, the centre-left *Le Monde* and the centre-right *Le Figaro. Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* were chosen for analysis in this article because they represent the two most prominent national dailies in France on either side of the traditional left–right political divide. Despite the digitisation, diversification, and democratisation of media, and the concurrent decline of newspapers, newspapers remain important framers of events and debates, especially on a national level. National dailies, such as *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* in particular, 'are the dominant agenda-setters in the French press system' and 'exercise a strong influence among key political and economic decision-makers, help set the agenda for other news media and act as a major forum for the discussion of new ideas in social and cultural matters' (Kuhn, 2011: 42). When it comes to Jewish–Muslim relations in France, by virtue of the steady polarisation described by Mandel (2014) and Katz (2015), the public has come to expect news reports that frame these relations as a tense set of oppositional relations between two separate groups. At the same time, however, the perpetuation of this oppositional frame continues to shape these public expectations. As Robert Entman (1993) notes, frames 'define problems', 'diagnose causes', 'make moral judgements', and 'suggest remedies' (p. 53). Thus, isolating dominant frames applied to the topic at hand can reveal the 'doxic' view of Jewish–Muslim relations in France. More precisely, an analysis of these frames elucidates how the media contributes to defining the 'problem' of Jewish–Muslim relations and what causes and 'solutions' it implicitly identifies.

Using the Europresse database, I searched for newspaper articles from *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* that mentioned the terms 'juifs', 'musulmans', and 'France' published within the time frame of 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2017. This initial search produced 2303 articles. Subsequently, I eliminated redundant articles (articles that were identical) and articles mentioning the key terms without actually being about relations between Jews and Muslims in France. Adopting an approach rooted in grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), I then began coding the headlines and lead paragraphs of the remaining articles until achieving theoretical saturation, at which point no new codes were emerging from the data. The decision to only code headlines and lead paragraphs at this first stage of data collection follows a long established approach to newspaper analysis (Van Dijk, 1988a; Bell, 1991). As David Champion and Simon Chapman explain, 'headlines and lead paragraphs […] contain the story's main trajectory, and encapsulate what the journalist and subeditor

consider to be the most important, newsworthy or interesting aspect' (2005: 680). Theoretical saturation occurred with a total of 299 articles. At this point, I was able to identify the key frames used by *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* for speaking about Jewish–Muslim relations in France.

Next, I conducted a discourse analysis of a down-sampled set of 21 articles, selected for having a frequency of more than 15 hits for the relevant search terms 'juif' and 'musulman' (and their plural and feminine variants). The frequency of the relevant search terms was chosen as the criterion for down-sampling following the approach of Baker and Levon (2015) in a comparative study of representations of masculinity in the British press. They found that

> down-sampling [based on frequency of occurrence of key search terms] produced a small set of salient articles where the particular identities [they were interested in] were likely to be foregrounded as a topic in themselves rather than mentioned 'in passing'. (p. 225)

My discourse analysis consists of a lexical, verbal, and representational analysis. In particular, I examine how different groups of adjectives and verbs are used to implicitly frame different groups of people and events. I also analyse the various representational strategies uncovered in the texts, such as the 'ideological square' (Van Dijk, 1998b) and the relevant analytical categories of Van Leeuwen (1996): individualisation/collectivisation, personalisation/impersonalisation, and objectivation. The concept of the ideological square refers to the construction of structural oppositions between an 'us' and a 'them', through the expression/emphasis of positive information about 'us', the expression/emphasis of negative information about 'them', the suppression/de-emphasis of positive information about 'them', or the suppression/de-emphasis of negative information about 'us' (Van Dijk, 1998b: 267). The related processes of individualisation and assimilation refer to the extent to which social actors are presented as individuals or assimilated into a larger collective. Personalisation and impersonalisation refer to the extent to which social actors are presented as speaking on their own individual behalf or on behalf of a larger entity. Objectivation refers to the process by which individuals are represented through, which is to say reduced to, a particular feature. Through discourse analysis, I aim to gain deeper insights into the contexts, meanings, and precise linguistic elements of each individual frame identified in the larger sample. This analysis provides systematic evidence for how common understandings of Jews and Muslims (and, implicitly, their relations) are constructed through language in the media.

Contextualising *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*

According to Yves Thréard, the deputy director of *Le Figaro*'s editorial board, today's *Figaro* 'ne roule pour personne'. He clarifies that the newspaper is a 'quotidien de conviction' and that if a journalist has left-wing convictions, then he or she would not fit in well at *Le Figaro* (De Morel, 2014). In addition to being firmly a right-wing, conservative 'journal d'opinion', *Le Figaro* has consistently demonstrated far-right potentialities throughout its history. Socially conservative and economically liberal, *Le Figaro* remains, however, the voice of mostly right or centre-right voting middle-class readers (Ifop, 2014). With an average monthly circulation of 311,417 copies in 2016 (ACPM, 2016a), *Le Figaro*, along with its centre-left rival *Le Monde*, also 'exercise[s] a strong influence among key economic and political decision makers, as well as acting as a major forum for the discussion of new ideas in social and cultural matters' (Kuhn, 2011: 42).

Despite welcoming a diversity of opinions within its columns, *Le Monde* has a recent history of supporting centrist and centre-left political parties and candidates and also of having long been the preferred newspaper of intellectuals, executives, and upper-level government administrators (Eveno, 1996). A relatively socially and economically liberal newspaper, while *Le Monde's* readers

tend to vote for left-wing candidates (51%), a significant percentage (26%), also vote for right-wing or centre-right candidates (Ifop, 2014). With an average monthly circulation of 260,294 copies in 2016, *Le Monde* is quantitatively a less popular national daily than *Le Figaro*, but qualitatively still maintains a reputation of being one of the two most respected and prestigious newspapers of record in France (ACPM, 2016b).

Thus, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* represent the two most prominent and influential national dailies in France on either side of the left–right political divide. Holders of symbolic power, these newspapers have also been – and continue to be – closely tied to political and economic power. Despite the digitisation, diversification, and democratisation of media, and the concurrent decline of much of the written press, newspapers remain important framers of events and debates, especially on a national level. *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* 'are [. . .] dominant agenda-setters in the French press system' (Kuhn, 2011: 42). Thus, even amid a decline in newspaper sales and despite the fact that the provincial newspaper sector is far larger than the national sector, it is the national dailies such as *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, in particular, that enjoy a privileged position in French politics and society. Their prestige, as well as their continued 'journalisme d'opinion', means that these newspapers maintain considerable capacities in terms of framing Jews and Muslims in contemporary France.

Jewish–Muslim relations and 'new' antisemitism

Since the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, relations between France's Jews and Muslims have been increasingly presented as tense in the French media. The beginning of the Second Intifada coincided with a dramatic increase in documented antisemitic incidents, disproportionately committed by young Muslim men. According to the data collected by the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme, the number of documented antisemitic incidents in France went from roughly a hundred in 1999 to just under a thousand in 2004 (CNCDH, 2016). Though never reaching this peak again, the annual number of antisemitic incidents has remained relatively high, in the hundreds, throughout the twenty-first century (CNCDH, 2016). In addition, Günther Jikeli's (2015) fine-grained sociological analysis of the range of antisemitic attitudes held by a segment of young male Muslims from disadvantaged backgrounds suggests the continued significance of Muslim antisemitism in structuring perceptions of Jewish–Muslim relations.

Several French writers and public intellectuals have characterised this post–Second Intifada recrudescence as a 'new' antisemitism. Pierre-André Taguieff, in his book *La nouvelle judéophobie* (2002), popularised the hypothesis of a new form of antisemitism whose main source was no longer far-right nationalists, but Muslim immigrants and their descendants who combine political Islamism with anti-Zionism. Taguieff's book also indicts a segment of the French left whose complicity with Muslim antisemitism (expressed as anti-Zionism) he terms *islamo-gauchisme*. Numerous media professionals, including prominent writers and public intellectuals such as Élisabeth Badinter (Truong, 2016), Pascal Bruckner (2006), and Caroline Fourest (2006), subsequently adopted the concept of a new *islamo-gauchiste* antisemitism, without a critical awareness of its uncanny proximity to the antisemitic trope of Judeo-Bolshevism from the previous century. The 'new' antisemitism hypothesis has also been adopted by a number of academics, such as Alan Dershowitz (2003), Shmuel Trigano (2003), Elhanan Yakira (2009), Bruno Chaouat (2010, 2013), Clemens Heni (2012), and Maurice Samuels (2016).

In France, a longer history of constructing Muslims as an unassimilable minority underpins the new antisemitism hypothesis. At least since the 1970s – and even more so during the 1980s and onwards – French politicians, journalists, and public opinion have been, to a large extent, preoccupied with, on the one hand, immigration, mainly of Muslims, from North and West Africa

and, on the other hand, the integration or assimilation of these 'new', 'different' immigrants and the threat of a *fracture sociale* they posed to 'French identity' and society.[2] These on-going debates take place in a series of politically charged and volatile contexts: first, anti-Arab racist attacks and killings carried out by both French law enforcement (the October 1961 massacre) and far-right agitators (the series of racist attacks in the summer and autumn of 1973); second, antisemitic attacks and killings carried out by Middle East–linked terrorists (the 1980 rue Copernic synagogue bombing), neo-Nazis (the 1990 profanation of a Jewish cemetery in Carpentras), banlieue youth (the 2006 torture and murder of Ilan Halimi), and Islamist terrorists (the 2012 Toulouse attacks and the 2015 kosher supermarket attack); third, bombings and terrorist attacks, sometimes related to Middle Eastern conflicts (the 1995–1996 Paris attacks); fourth, the incremental electoral successes of the Front National (renamed the Rassemblement National in 2018); and finally, the numerous legal interventions on (legal and illegal) immigration, racial discrimination, and the wearing of religious symbols in public space (mostly affecting Muslim women who veil).

By the end of the 1990s, Muslims in France were increasingly depicted in media and political discourse as a community apart, defined in religious terms and connected to international understandings of Islam, such as through the 1979 Iranian revolution and, later, the 1991 Gulf War, the 1995–1996 Paris attacks, the Second Intifada, the September 11 attacks, and other Islamist terrorist attacks in France and Europe (Deltombe, 2005). Even so, while often presented in the media and political discourse as a monolithic group that has failed to integrate, several studies have demonstrated both the relative integration of French Muslims and the diversity of this population beyond simple clichés and media stereotypes (Beaman, 2017; Davidson, 2012; Fredette, 2014; Laurence and Vaïsse, 2006). Nevertheless, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concept of *communautarisme* (or ethnic communalism/factionalism) was increasingly applied to Muslims in France to understand their perceived lack of integration, through the prism of Islam, without interrogating institutionalised structures of exclusion. In France, the term *communautarisme* is associated with Anglo-American 'multiculturalism' – and, in particular, the formation of ethnic enclaves – and opposed to assimilation. Usage of the term was generally uncommon prior to the 2000s when it became ubiquitous in media and political discourse, especially in the context of the various headscarf, face veil, and burkini affairs; the 2005 banlieue riots; and, more generally, the presumed failure of the integration of a part of the Muslim minority (Dhume-Sonzogni, 2016). Faced with the statistical rise of antisemitic incidents since 2000, including high-profile murders (Ilan Halimi in 2006) and terrorist attacks (Toulouse in 2012), as well as the antisemitic nature of some anti-Israel protests in France, such as during the 2014 Gaza war, the discourse of a new antisemitism partly draws on a decades-old creation of a 'Muslim problem'. In this context, Jewish–Muslim relations in France have come to be understood as inherently tense due, in large part, to an allegedly 'new' strand of (Muslim) antisemitism that is exacerbated by the *communautarisme* of French Muslims.

Primary frames

I identified nine primary frames in the 299-article sample: religion (positive, negative, and neutral), Israel-Palestine, Muslim (or 'new') antisemitism, youth, school, memory (positive and negative), similarity, Jewish 'Islamophobia', and *communautarisme* (Table 1). This is unsurprising given the post-2000 media and political context that draws on the hypothesis of a 'new' antisemitism (driven by male Muslim youths) and the salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to explain presumed tensions between Jews and Muslims. In addition, I found that virtually all articles in the sample exhibited 'groupism' (Brubaker, 2004) when portraying Jews and Muslims. Groupism refers to 'the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous, and externally

Table 1. Frames in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*.

Frequency	Percentage	Frame
152	50.8	Muslim ('new') antisemitism
137	45.8	Israel-Palestine
112	40.8	Youth
92	30.7	*Communautarisme*
78	26.1	Similarity
67	22.4	Religious (−)
46	15.4	Religious (+)
39	13.0	School
35	11.7	Religious (neutral)
27	9.0	Memory (+)
13	4.3	Memory (−)
10	3.3	Jewish 'Islamophobia'

bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts' (Brubaker, 2004: 164). Thus, rather than a frame in itself, groupism, here, can be considered to be the overarching framework of representing Jews and Muslims in relation to one and other in the media, since it structures discussions of these two 'groups' in every article in the sample. The common point of departure of all the sampled articles – even those that sought to be nuanced and depict the relationship between Jews and Muslims as not inherently oppositional – was the unsaid belief that these were two separate and homogeneous groups, that, in a nutshell, there was *a* Jewish community and *a* Muslim community in France.

Appearing in 50.8% of articles, the Muslim 'new' antisemitism frame was the most significant frame, which is unsurprising given the prominence of the 'new' antisemitism hypothesis between the publication of Taguieff's *La nouvelle judéophobie* (2002) and the multi-author *Le nouvel antisémitisme* (2018). Articles that evoked Muslim 'new' antisemitism mostly did so in order to explain the tension between Jews and Muslims in France. These articles also frequently employed the Israel-Palestine (45.8%) and youth (40.8%) frames, which were the next most significant frames. In contrast, used in only 3.3% of the sampled articles, the Jewish 'Islamophobia' frame was the least frequent frame and was mostly employed when already citing Muslim antisemitism as a source of tension. Indeed, Jewish 'Islamophobia' was not cited as a reason or a cause for tension, but rather as a consequence of Muslim antisemitism. This is significant for two reasons. First, Jewish 'Islamophobia' is possibly considered a secondary issue that results from the primary issue of Muslim antisemitism. Second, Jewish 'Islamophobia' is possibly seen as a (potentially justifiable) reaction to Muslim antisemitism. The *communautarisme* frame, while related to groupism, is not the same. The fourth most significant frame, the *communautarisme* (30.7%) frame, depicts either group as increasingly closed unto itself and wary of outsiders. Nevertheless, the similarity (26.1%) frame, which highlighted the ethno-cultural and historical similarities between Jews and Muslims, closely followed the *communautarisme* frame. The memory frame was relatively infrequent and used both in positive (9.0%) terms – to highlight past Jewish–Muslim entente in, for example, Andalusia or Algeria – and in negative (4.3%) terms – to highlight the persecution of Jews in 'Muslim lands' or to highlight the disparities in perspectives on, for example, the question of Algeria.

There were few significant differences in the distribution of frames between *Le Monde* articles and *Le Figaro* articles (Tables 2 and 3). In general, both dailies prioritised a similar set of dominant

Table 2. Frames in *Le Monde*.

Frequency	Percentage	Frame
82	46.3	Muslim ('new') antisemitism
81	45.8	Israel-Palestine
57	32.2	*Communautarisme*
54	30.5	Similarity
54	30.5	Youth
29	16.4	Religious (−)
24	13.6	School
24	13.6	Religious (+)
21	11.9	Religious (neutral)
18	10.2	Memory (+)
8	4.5	Jewish Islamophobia
5	2.8	Memory (−)

Table 3. Frames in *Le Figaro*.

Frequency	Percentage	Frame
71	58.2	Muslim ('new') antisemitism
59	48.3	Youth
57	46.7	Israel-Palestine
39	32.0	Religious (−)
36	29.5	*Communautarisme*
24	19.7	Similarity
22	18.0	Religious (+)
15	12.3	School
14	11.5	Religious (neutral)
9	7.4	Memory (+)
8	6.5	Memory (−)
2	1.6	Jewish 'Islamophobia'

frames: Muslim antisemitism, Israel-Palestine, youth, and *communautarisme*. Yet, even if in both newspapers the Muslim antisemitism frame was the most prominent, *Le Figaro* was more likely to prioritise this frame, with 58.2% of their articles displaying this frame compared with 46.3% of *Le Monde* articles. In addition, the youth frame was more prominent in *Le Figaro* articles than in *Le Monde* articles. The Israel-Palestine frame remained equally significant in both newspapers. Interestingly, *Le Figaro* was more likely than *Le Monde* to employ a negative religious frame by, for example, attributing Muslim antisemitism to religiosity. Nevertheless, *Le Figaro* was also more likely than *Le Monde* to employ a positive religious frame by, for example, citing positive interreligious efforts by religious institutions and leaders. One key difference between the two newspapers relates to the similarity frame. In *Le Monde*, this frame was the fourth most significant frame and was employed in 30.5% of the articles. In *Le Figaro*, however, this percentage drops to 19.7% and to the sixth place.

A cursory glance at these frames already suggests that they are not necessarily in conflict with each other. Indeed, while a few articles only demonstrated one frame, most others used several, even if one or two were more pronounced. The frames identified here somewhat overlap with

Katz's findings that, since the First World War, four elements have defined representations and understandings of Jewish–Muslim relations, 'namely the colonial, the religious, the transnational, and the racial' (Katz, 2015: 25). Indeed, the religion frame corresponds to Katz's religious category; the Israel-Palestine frame to his transnational category; the Muslim antisemitism, Jewish 'Islamophobia', and the *communautarisme* frames to his 'racial' category; and the memory frame to his colonial category. This suggests a longer history to the frames that my analysis has uncovered, as well as their continued importance in contemporary media representations of Jews and Muslims in France.

Discourse analysis

The earlier frame analysis demonstrated that the newspapers in question privileged the interpretative lenses of Muslim ('new') antisemitism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, youth delinquency, and *communautarisme*, within an overarching groupist perspective. This section looks at the discursive tools used to construct Jewish-Muslims, in a groupist perspective, as troubled and tense mostly because of Muslims. Through the discourse analysis, I found the recurrent use of the following discursive strategies: recourse to authority, vagueness, individualisation/assimilation, and personalisation/impersonalisation. In addition, I noted a pattern of employing verbs and adjectives related to emotions, suggesting that affect is foregrounded in contemporary newspaper reporting on Jews and Muslims. Interestingly, there was also no striking differences between articles from earlier and from later years in the sample. In this section, I present these findings through a detailed discussion of a representative selection of articles in the sample.

Recourse to authority

The articles displayed both personal and impersonal authority legitimation (Van Leeuwen, 2007), which is to say that the statements and arguments presented were occasionally justified through citing 'experts' or through oblique references to abstract values and ideals, such as 'la République' or 'la laïcité'. Often, 'experts' or 'community leaders' would be invited to write an op-ed, where they would 'explain' or 'confirm' what was really taking place. Consider the following examples where experts or other authority figures are cited:

1. L'actualité confirme nos craintes sur la liberté d'avoir un lieu de culte, explique le grand rabbin Marc Ben Soussan (Laborde, 2000).
2. Écoutons ce que déclarait Pierre Mendès France, figure unanimement admirée et modèle de modération, à la tribune de l'Assemblée nationale lors du débat relatif au traité de Rome: 'Si le mouvement des capitaux et des biens peut à première vue ne pas paraître toucher aux concepts de nation et de patrie, il n'en est pas de même pour les migrations de populations. Il n'est pas indifférent pour l'avenir de la France ni que, pendant une période, les Italiens affluent en France, ni que, simultanément ou pendant une autre période, les Français du Languedoc, de l'Auvergne, ou de la Bretagne soient conduits à chercher de meilleures conditions de travail dans une Allemagne qui, en cours de développement rapide, offrirait des emplois à des travailleurs menacés par le chômage'. Il va sans dire que, à l'époque, ces propos n'ont pas déclenché la moindre réprobation (Bastié, 2017).

The first example is taken from a 2000 article by Jean-Pierre Laborde that reports on the revelation that the mayor of Nice made a couple of anti-Muslim statements in two letters dating from May 1999. At a time when the phenomenon 'new' antisemitism ('nouvelle judéophobie') is

increasingly debated, this *Le Monde* article cites the chief rabbi of Nice in order to suggest a religious Jewish-Muslim solidarity that emerges in opposition to a secular state (embodied by the mayor of Nice) that is presented as hostile to religious freedom. The author of the article notes, 'depuis plusieurs années, catholiques, juifs et musulmans entretiennent, dans les Alpes-Maritimes, des relations étroites'. He neither provides an exact time frame of these close relations nor does he provide evidence for his claim. Rather, he cites both the indignation of the chief rabbi and the bishop of Nice. Of course, the fact that Jewish and Christian religious leaders express their disapproval of a politician's anti-Muslim remarks does not necessarily mean that Catholics, Jews, and Muslims share 'des relations étroites'. Nevertheless, this is how the author of the article presents the situation. Again, this is indicative of the groupism that I have been highlighting throughout this article. In the line I have highlighted above, the words 'confirm' and 'explain' are particularly revealing of the way in which newspaper articles perceive the link between on-the-ground realities and the statements of authority figures. The recourse to communal and religious leaders, at the local, regional, and national levels, is a common occurrence in the subsample. Consider this other example:

> [. . .] le grand rabbin de France, Joseph Sitruk, explique que 'ce qui inquiète encore le plus la communauté, c'est le sentiment qu'autour de nous on banalise et on dédramatise ces incidents'. (Ternisien, 2001)

Like the chief rabbi of Nice, Joseph Sitruk's explanation of what worries the Jewish community (which his statement has coalesced into a singular national community) is presented to the reader as factual *because* it is coming from the chief rabbi of France. In this particular article, Xavier Ternisien also quotes other figures of authority, such as Roger Cukierman, in order to argue that *the* Jewish community is increasingly anxious. Obtaining confirmation from communal and religious leaders appears to be the preferred method for taking the pulse of on-the-ground sentiments, rather than actually probing sentiments on the ground.

The second example is taken from an article on what is implied to be mainly Muslim 'mass immigration' written by Eugénie Bastié, a *Figaro* journalist sometimes compared to Eric Zemmour for her reactionary politics. Like many other contemporary reactionary or far-right figures in France, Bastié evokes Pierre Mendès-France, a figure who is decidedly not on the far right of the spectrum, in order to argue against what she perceives to be 'mass immigration'. In doing so, she is following the lead of the new generation of National Front leaders (Marine Le Pen, Louis Aliot, etc.) who, in seeking to rebrand the FN and to 'de-demonise' the party, depart from overtly extremist language and adopt a more politically acceptable rhetoric, albeit often with the same goals in mind. Other than the adoption of goals not traditionally associated with the party, such as 'defence of public services, increases in modest incomes and pensions' (Stockemer and Amengay, 2015), environmental issues, animal rights, feminism, and gay rights, these figures make less references to traditionally far-right thinkers and more references to 'republican' or 'universalist' thinkers. Similarly, Bastié appropriates the figure of Pierre Mendès-France, whom she describes as '[une] figure unanimement admirée et [un] modèle de modération', in order to support her anti-immigrant argument. Her words are carefully chosen in order to align the reader with her argument through citing this presumably republican former Prime Minister ('président du conseil des ministres'). First, we are told to listen to Mendès-France whose words are described as a declaration ('écoutons ce que déclarait Pierre Mendès-France'). By using the first-person plural imperative, Bastié creates an 'us' that she is speaking to and places this 'us' and Pierre Mendès-France on the same 'side' against immigrants and immigration. Furthermore, to declare is not simply to make known or to communicate something; rather, it is to proclaim with authority. The verb itself, in this context, primes the reader for a statement of truth from an authority figure. Imagine the difference had

Bastié written 'voici ce qu'a dit Pierre Mendès-France'. Second, Bastié qualifies Mendès-France as 'unanimement admirée' and states that 'il va sans dire que, à l'époque, ces propos n'ont pas déclenché la moindre réprobation'. By using the adjective 'unanimement', following on her construction of an 'us' that is aligned with Mendès-France, Bastié provides a veneer of universality both to Mendès-France and, now by extension, to her anti-immigrant arguments. By using the phrase 'il va sans dire', she aims to pass off both Mendès-France's statement (taken out of context) and her own contemporary argument as commonsensical and obvious. By stating that, in 1957, Mendès-France's statement did not provoke disapproval from anyone, Bastié is implying that her own anti-immigrant stance ought not to be considered problematic today.

Vagueness

In addition to the referencing of vague, unclear, or undefined concepts, almost every article in the subsample used vague quantifiers ('beaucoup', 'certains', etc.) to give the sense that a particular phenomenon was widespread and to, perhaps, justify its mediatised prominence. Consider the following examples:

1. [. . .] l'identification de certains jeunes musulmans en difficulté d'intégration en France avec les Palestiniens (Chambon, 2000).
2. Beaucoup de gens se plaignent d'être insultés et ne sont pas très rassurés (Chambon, 2000).
3. Elle reconnaît que sa relation avec certains jeunes musulmans a changé (Ternisien, 2000).
4. Comme beaucoup, Farid, lui, évoque la 'solidarité musulmane' à l'égard des 'frères' palestiniens [. . .] (Chambon, 2002).
5. Beaucoup ont vécu ces événements comme 'un choc', voire comme une remise en cause de leur appartenance à la nation (Broussard, 2003).
6. Mais parfois décrié dans sa communauté, ses détracteurs l'appellent 'l'imam des Juifs'. Soupçonné de trahison, Chalghoumi est mis à l'index dans certaines mosquées (Gabizon, 2009).
7. Pas facile cependant dans certains quartiers où sur fond de conflit israélo-palestinien et de radicalisation de certains groups les scènes de violence ne sont pas rares. D'autant que dans certains quartiers sensibles, juifs et musulmans vivent moins près les uns des autres que par le passé (Sérès, 2010).
8. Beaucoup de juifs se sont posés la question: s'il n'y avait eu que l'attentat de l'Hyper Cacher, y aurait-il eu 4 millions de personnes dans la rue ? On a beaucoup vu 'je suis Charlie', on a beaucoup moins vu 'je suis juif', il faut être honnête (Chambraud, 2015).

In the examples above, the quantifiers used are either 'certain' or 'beaucoup' and refer to young Muslims, 'people' in general, mosques, neighbourhoods, groups, and Jews. The texts appear to be careful to not generalise from particular cases by referring to, for example, 'certains jeunes musulmans' and not 'jeunes musulmans' in general. However, when almost every article in the subsample uses the same quantifiers without explaining who are really being referred to, a contrary effect is produced. When 'some young Muslims' are described as being engaged in a certain behaviour or 'some mosques' are cited as being hostile to liberal imams, but the texts do not actually clarify who the young Muslims are or which are the mosques in question, the effect is actually that the statements made about a particular case are extended to the general because, in the end, when certain mosques or certain young Muslims are not identified, they could be any mosque or any young Muslim and thus every mosque or every young Muslim. Similarly, when 'beaucoup' is used, the articles do not clarify what the quantifier really means. Does 'beaucoup' mean at least

more than half or more than three-quarters or some other fraction? 'Beaucoup' is simply used to assert a sense of completeness or generalisability. When some articles repeatedly refer to 'some' members of a particular group and other articles repeatedly refer to 'many' members of a particular group, the effect is a generalisation of the group(s) in question. Thus, through the use of generalised vague quantifiers, the articles in the subsample reinforce the profile of, on the one hand, Muslims as young, delinquent, badly integrated, and solitary with Palestinians and hostile to Israel (and by extension to Jews) and, on the other hand, Jews as worried, insecure, and increasingly the target of (Muslim) antisemitism and violence.

Personalisation/impersonalisation

In the subsample, at times both Jewish and Muslim actors are personalised or impersonalised, albeit to different extents and at different frequencies. Actors are personalised or impersonalised through the usage of proper nouns, nouns, adjectives, or even verbs. Objectivation – reducing individuals metonymically to a facet of their identity – is an important form of impersonalisation used in these articles. Consider the following examples where different individuals are either personalised (or humanised) or impersonalised (or dehumanised):

1. La secrétaire de la synagogue de Vincennes s'est fait intimider par deux Arabes qui étaient dans une voiture alors qu'elle fermait la porte de la synagogue [. . .] (Ternisien, 2001).
2. À la suite de ces incidents, deux jeunes couples ont décidé d'aller vivre en Israël avec leurs enfants (Sedar, 2002).
3. On ne peut pas juger des parents qui s'inquiètent pour leurs enfants. Quand un enfant a mal au ventre car il a peur d'aller à l'école, peur de mourir, qui ne serait pas bouleversé (Chambraud, 2015)?
4. Il est important que la partie culturellement musulmane de notre société soit à l'unisson de la communauté nationale et dénonce l'islamisme radical. Si elle le dénonce de façon massive, il n'y aura pas d'amalgame, au contraire. Mais il faut que la dénonciation vienne de partout, pas seulement de quelques responsables qui ne sont pas forcément écoutés par les jeunes (Chambraud, 2015).
5. Akim, jeune d'origine maghrébine qui habite la cite des peintres 'depuis toujours', réfute cette thèse et plaide la modération. 'Ici, il n'y a jamais eu de problèmes entre Juifs et Arabes. Quand vous voyez à la télévision un enfant palestinien qu'on tue, ça vous touche et vous vous sentez solidaires en tant qu'Arabe. Mais de là à mettre le feu à une synagogue . . . ça ne sert à rien', affirme Akim, venu prendre un café chez Yasmine, 'Fast-food hallal', le QG des jeunes du quartier. Pourtant, Akim s'agace du discours de la communauté juive. 'Les juifs, c'est toujours eux les victimes et c'est toujours les Arabes qu'on enfonce, là-bas et ici', martèle-t-il (Chambon, 2000).

The first example is perhaps one of the clearest in terms of the differing extents of personalisation and impersonalisation of Jews and Muslims in the subsample. We are told that the woman in question is a secretary of the Vincennes synagogue who was closing up before going home when she was 'intimidated' by 'two Arabs'. While all we are told about the assailants is that they are 'two Arabs', the victim is personalised through the mention of her job and workplace and, just as importantly, the fact that she was closing up just as any employee would do at the end of the day. In this way, she is personalised and humanised, while the two Arabs are impersonalised and remain two Arabs, therefore also objectified and genericised as emblematic of a larger social group, that is, 'Arabs' in

general. Similarly, in the second and third examples, Jewish individuals are personalised through the nouns ‘couples’, ‘parents’, and ‘enfants’ and the adjective ‘jeunes’. The term ‘jeune’ has a generally negative connotation in the sample when either used on its own (which usually means it implicitly refers to Muslims) or explicitly applied to Muslims. When it is applied to Jews, however, the term can take on a more sympathetic connotation, as it does in the second example.

The contrast in both the differing usage of ‘jeune’ and the differing extents of personalisation and impersonalisation can be observed by looking at examples 4 and 5. In example 4, Muslims are assimilated into a large block described as ‘la partie culturellement musulmane de notre société’ and called on to denounce ‘radical Islamism’ as one entity. In general, it was common in the subsample for articles to genericise Muslims and individualise Jews. In example 5, a Muslim individual is personalised to a large extent. First, he is identified by a proper noun, his name. Second, he is directly quoted. Third, he is described as getting a cup of coffee, an act which allows an average observer to identify with him to the extent that getting a cup of coffee is a common everyday practice. At the same time, however, his personalisation, unlike the personalisation of Jewish actors as previously demonstrated, is conditional. First, Akim is immediately described as a ‘jeune d’origine maghrébine’, which may seem to be solely descriptive, but is loaded with negative cultural connotations linked to delinquency and violence. Given the tendency of newspaper articles to generalise about ‘jeunes’, by categorising Akim as a ‘jeune d’origine maghrébine’, Akim is actually being presented as a generic type, which is to say that, despite being personalised by the use of his name and the description of him engaged in an ordinary and common practice, he is also genericised and, perhaps, impersonalised. The sense that Akim is a generic type, that is, another Maghrebi youth, is further heightened by the fact that his café of choice is called ‘Fast-food hallal’ and is described as the headquarters for the ‘jeunes du quartier’. Furthermore, despite Akim’s initial statement that there have never been problems between Jews and Muslims in his neighbourhood, he is also presented as irked by what is described as the Jewish community’s victimary posturing. Thus, despite being personalised, Akim is also subtly genericised as yet another Maghrebi youth and thereby impersonalised. This is fairly representative of personalisation of Muslims in the subsample. Indeed, their personalisation is rarely unconditional and is often undercut.

Affective language

There are an abundance of (mostly) negative affective words in the subsample. Historical studies of Jewish–Muslim relations in France have shown that Jews and Muslims have always interacted in complex and non-binary ways. In general, newspaper articles do not reflect this complexity and, instead, often resort to a simpler, oppositional binary frame. In particular, this binary frame is lexically constructed through recourse to a negative affective language, thereby priming observers to adopt negative perceptive lenses when approaching Jewish–Muslim relations. Furthermore, since Jews are frequently described as victims and Muslims as their tormentors, this negative affective language is part of the ideological squaring that inclines observers to identify with Jews over Muslims.

In total, there were 83 occurrences of affective terms (Table 4). Except for the word ‘amour’, which occurred once, all other affective terms had a negative value. Terms related to uneasiness (16 occurrences), fear (13 occurrences), and tension (9 occurrences) were the most recurrent in the subsample. A look at the context of these occurrences reveals that uneasiness and fear were associated with Jews, while tension was always used to describe Jews and Muslims relationally. In short, Jewish–Muslim relations are repeatedly described through affective language as tense and Jews are described as uneasy in contemporary French society and fearful of a perceived rising Muslim antisemitism. The result is, on the one hand, an ideological squaring and, on the other

Table 4. Affective terminology.

Term	Frequency	Term	Frequency
malaise, mal-être, sentiment d'insécurité, angoisse, mal, inquiétude, inquiet, s'inquiéter, inquiétant, anxiété, appréhension	16	tension.s, tendu.es, crispation	9
peur, crainte, craindre, redouter, redouté.es	13	passion, passionné.es, attiser les passions, excités, échauffement des esprits	5
choqué, choc, abasourdie	4	indignation, indigné.es	4
écœurant, mal au ventre	3	sentiment	3
étonner, surpris	2	ressentir	2
émotion	2	désarroi	2
rancœur, ressentiment	2	honte	1
frustrations	2	satanisation	1
traumatisme, traumatisé	2	fantasmer	1
ébranlement	1	blessure	1
fissure	1	tiraillé	1
amour	1	révoltés	1
se sentir abandonnée	1	tristesse	1
irrationnel.le	1		

hand, a priming of the reader to perceive the situation as emotionally charged and through negative lenses.

Conclusion

This article makes two main observations about French newspapers and their representation of Jews, Muslims, and their relations with one another. First, they construct 'Jews' and 'Muslims' as disparate, homogeneous, and oppositional communities while generally ignoring both the internal diversity of each category and the variety of ways that individual Jews and Muslims interact with each other on a daily basis in twenty-first-century France.

Second, they implicitly present intergroup relations as tense, conflictual, and asymmetrical struggles. Over the last two decades, France's two main broadsheet newspapers have consistently divided Jews and Muslims into two singular and separate groups and present individuals as acting in accordance with the normative logic of their group membership. In addition, the newspapers often present relations and interactions between Jews and Muslims as an exclusive function of religion and race. In the case of Muslims, their religiosity appears to be heavily racialised, while Jewishness is more likely to be described in cultural and religious terms. In addition, Muslims are more likely to be described as immigrants or descendants of immigrants than Jews.

Finally, the figure of the violent, young, male, banlieue Muslim is put forth by both newspapers as the primary propagator of the 'new antisemitism'. In contrast, French Jews are often described as defenceless victims. In this way, readers are primed to align themselves with the Jewish victim over the Muslim assailant. The discourse analysis, in particular, displays how the articles use authority figures, vagueness, and the strategies of individualisation/assimilation and personalisation/impersonalisation to construct and maintain this particular representation of Jews, Muslims, and their

relations. In this way, even without articles being about Jewish–Muslim relations per say, relations between Jews and Muslims are implicitly represented as inherently troubled in post-2000 France.

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Notes

1. Individuals, groups, media sources, and politicians all use frames to make sense of the world ('meaning-making') *and* organise perceptions and communicate about things in the world. A frame is an 'interpretative schema that simplifies and condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action' (Snow and Benford, 1988: 137). All forms of communication and all messages, from mundane, daily interactions to landmark political moments, are framed in particular ways. In terms of media research, framing encodes news events in ways that conform to the expectations of their readership while also shaping their opinion.
2. See Hajjat and Mohammed (2016: 102–114) for a detailed analysis of the construction of a 'Muslim problem' in France from the 1980s to the present.

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